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a b s t r a c t
The expansion of middle-income countries in the global South is now widely acknowledged as significant
for international development research and practice. But, as yet, scholars have not fully considered how
middle-income countries are responding to the new global goals on international development (the
Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs) outlined in Agenda 2030. Equally, insufficient attention has been
paid to how – if at all – the SDGs shape domestic development policies and practices in middle income
countries. We ask these questions in Ecuador, a country that recently moved from being a lower middle-
income and donor dependent country to a more autonomous higher middle-income country with the
capacity to promote its own national domestic development approach, Buen Vivir (in English: living well).
Deploying a qualitative case study methodology and drawing primarily on in-depth semi-structured
interviews conducted with policy makers working in Ecuador’s national government and in the capital
Quito, we show that policy makers’ engagement with the SDGs is selective, with an emphasis on those
goals and targets which are considered of domestic importance. Both the national government and
Quito’s local government are currently focussing mainly on SDGs 10.2 (breaking inequalities) and 11
(inclusive cities). We demonstrate that, in practice, how policy makers understand implementation of
these ‘‘priority” goals is not consistent; it depends on political preferences, where policy makers are
located in the architecture of decentralised governance and the context-specific challenges they face.
Evidence from Ecuador suggests that the SDGs cannot be understood as a single coherent template for
development that states will simply adopt. Rather they should be analysed in the context of a rapidly
changing architecture of global power, shaped by the context-specific nature of national development
challenges and national political structures, including decentralisation.
 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
How are middle-income countries2 in the global South respond-
ing to the new global goals on international development, the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outlined in Agenda 20303?
How, if at all, do the SDGs shape domestic development policies
and practices? These are particularly pertinent questions to ask
now, as the euphoria of having managed to get global agreement
on the content of Agenda 2030 fades and we turn to what the SDGs
mean on the ground. We can expect their impact to be considerably
different from the earlier round of international standard setting for
development, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) because
of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the global
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.04.005
0305-750X/ 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: p.horn@sheffield.ac.uk (P. Horn), Jean.grugel@york.ac.uk (J.
Grugel).
1 Both authors contributed equally to this paper.
2 According to the World Bank, middle-income countries are those which have per
capital income of US$ 1006–US$ 12,235 (see also: http://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/mic/overview). They make up around a third of global GNP. Divided into
lower and upper middle-income countries, the numbers are growing (see also:
https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-level-201
7–2018). Their voices are increasingly heard globally through international fora such
as the G20, G77 and regional organisations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and Mercosur. Despite high levels of economic growth, they have
distinct development needs that include rapid and unregulated urbanization,
migration, diversity, inequality and poverty (Gray & Murphy, 2013; Mawdsley,
2017; Scoones, Amanor, Favareto & Qi, 2016).
3 Agenda 2030 that sets out the new global agenda for sustainable development to
be achieved by the year 2030. It contains the 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), that is the steps by which the over-arching aim of "leaving no one behind” in
development, which is at the heart of the Agenda 2030 document, should be met. The
terms ‘‘Agenda 2030” and ‘‘SDGs” are often used interchangeably, but for reasons of
precision and clarity, we have generally used ‘‘SDGs” here to refer to processes of
engagement with the goals and targets that were ratified with or after the Agenda
2030 document, whilst ‘‘Agenda 2030” is used to refer to the process that led to the
formulation of the document.
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architecture of power, production, and influence, allied to the fact
that the SDGs are a broader, more ambitious and less quantifiable
sets of goals. The phenomenal rise of the Chinese economy and the
expansion of middle income economies in the global South both sug-
gest that the model of global governance in which globally-
determined priorities for development were willingly or coercively
adopted in low and middle-income countries no longer holds. How
the shifts in power away from the West and the rise of the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other ‘‘developing”
countries are reshaping global politics has been subject to consider-
able analysis (Ikenberry, 2008; Kahler, 2013); but scholars have not,
as yet, fully uncovered what these shifts mean for engagement with,
and integration of, the SDGs at the domestic level within middle-
income countries.
This paper asks those questions in Ecuador, which serves as an
example of a country which has changed recently from being a
lower middle-income and donor dependent country to a more
autonomous higher middle-income country. Ecuador has set out
a distinctive set of policies and aspirations for national develop-
ment, known as sumac kawsay in Quechua or Buen Vivir in Spanish
(‘‘living well” in English). Evidence from our case study suggests
that the SDGs are not going to be integrated wholesale into
national policy-making. Policy makers are engaging selectively
with those SDG goals and targets that resonate with national prior-
ities and their views about what development consists of. Since the
SDGs are not legally binding but represent a high-level policy doc-
ument that comes without the tools of external enforcement
(Brolan, 2016; Pogge & Sengupta, 2016), they can be interpreted
and understood in quite different ways, meaning that policy mak-
ers in Ecuador are able to decide the nature of engagement with
them. Moreover, they are doing so in accordance with a logic that
is predominantly domestic. The SDGs, in other words, are not
determining what Ecuadorian development means. They are,
rather, legitimising development goals and policies that have
already been decided on.
Just as importantly, responses to the SDGs in middle income
countries are bound to be shaped by domestic governance struc-
tures. In the case of Ecuador, one particularly pertinent character-
istic is the recent decentralization of the state. The result is that we
cannot identify a single ‘‘Ecuadorian” response to the SDGs –
engagement with, and interpretation of, the SDGs depend on an
array of factors such as policy makers’ preferences, their location
in the architecture of national governance and the challenges they
face. To illustrate, we show here how policy makers in the capital
city, Quito, have been able to make their own strategic choices
around SDG engagement, driven in part by opposition to the poli-
cies of the party in control of the national government, Alianza País.
Home to 2.2 million residents or approximately 13 per cent of the
country’s population and 20 per cent of the country’s urban popu-
lation, Quito is one of the richest and most powerful cities in the
country with an annual budget of USD 1.4 billion in 2016 and a
staff of over 2000 employees. Quito has, in other words, the polit-
ical, financial and symbolic resources that enable it to make a dis-
tinctive response to the SDGs of its own.
The article proceeds as follows. In the first part, we discuss how
recent transformations in global governance and global economic
power have changed the meaning of global development initia-
tives, at least in middle-income countries. Thus far, most discus-
sion of the SDGs have focused on Agenda 2030 as a global
framework for development (Gore, 2015; Horner & Hulme, 2017;
Sachs, 2012); we suggest that it also makes sense to pay close
attention to domestic-level responses. We then discuss the value
of taking a qualitative case study approach to the SDGs and provide
some background on Ecuador, our case study, and the methodolog-
ical approach we have adopted, before discussing the different
domestic engagements with the SDGs in Ecuador in detail. Here,
we examine the substantive and discursive roles the SDGs play
for policy makers in Ecuador’s national government, where we
focus on the selective engagement of senior staff in different insti-
tutions but particularly within the National Secretary for Planning
and Development (SENPLADES), the government body formally in
charge for domestic development planning, and in Quito’s local
government. Nationally and at city level, there is particularly
strong engagement with SDG 10.2 (breaking inequalities) and
SDG 11 (inclusive cities), both of which were identified as priority
areas in earlier national planning rounds. But the national govern-
ment and the city of Quito interpret SDGs 10.2 and 11 quite differ-
ently. We consider what these findings mean for our4
understanding of the SDGs in middle-income countries in the final
section of the paper.
2. The MDGs to the SDGs: From global governance to domestic
politics
Orthodox ideas and practices of ‘‘development” reflect the
structures of global power. The end of the Cold War heralded a rare
(and ultimately fleeting) moment of global consensus that was
quite quickly followed by renewed fragmentation politically, eco-
nomically and culturally (Horner & Hulme, 2017; Koehler, 2015).
Economic shifts mean that so-called ‘‘advanced countries” are no
longer confined to the West, while the liberal values associated
with Western hegemony are increasingly questioned. As the West
weakens, contemporary development aspirations in the global
South no longer necessarily cohere, or at least not straightfor-
wardly, around Western ideals.
The ‘‘Millennium Moment” reflected both the authority of the
US and Europe and the fact that the West was trying to exercise
this authority in a significantly less coercive and more inclusive
fashion (Inglehart, 2008). Less confident of its economic power,
the West reverted after 1989 to shoring up its ideational and moral
leadership through a looser and more persuasive set of mecha-
nisms for rule, often referred to as ‘‘global governance”. Global gov-
ernance seeks to bind countries together in apparently shared
collective endeavours. The underpinning ideas remain, though, res-
olutely pro-Western. As Payne (2007: 8) notes ‘‘the notion of global
governance is a serious misnomer; indeed, it is grounded in a
deceit. What presently purports to be global governance is really
governance of the globe by the powerful, justified by protestations
about the need to offer leadership to the inhabitants of the whole
of the globe”. In effect, post-Cold War global governance sought to
reboot western authority, but without unpicking the inequalities of
economic power or the structures of global financial and trade
governance.
This fin-de-siècle approach to disciplining the global South was
nonetheless somewhat different from earlier incarnations of west-
ern power. Ideas, rather than overt material power, were now
recognised as important drivers of global politics and coercion
was replaced with more appealing concepts such as citizenship,
democracy and human rights. This shift had a significant impact
on the agenda of international development. In particular, since
4 Discussion of the relationship between the so-called advanced capitalist countries
(or ‘the West’) broadly defined, and the ‘developing’ world is entirely beyond the
scope of this paper. However, the key point is that Marxist and heterodox accounts of
the global economic order place considerable stress on the role of the first set of
countries in conditioning and shaping growth processes in the second set of countries.
See the work of Frank (1966) for an early and seminal statement of how the West
‘underdeveloped’ the places it colonised and Cardoso and Faletto (1979) for a detailed
description of this process in Latin America. The impact of the end of the Cold War is
discussed in Wallerstein (1993), from a world systems approach, and the significance
of the rise of China for global order is discussed in Ikenberrry (2008). Hobson (2012)
analyses the way in which eurocentrism has shaped theories of international order,
and therefore of the context of international development debates.
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1989, development has gradually become associated with civil
society, partnership, the promotion of human rights and the adop-
tion of pro-democratic norms (Welzel, Inglehart, & Kligemann,
2003). This more ‘‘human” face of Western power contributed
directly to the articulation of the first agenda for international
development based not on the principles of economic growth but
on the importance of people (Hulme & Scott, 2010; Hulme,
2010). The MDGs were established following the Millennium Sum-
mit of the United Nations in 2000 and set out eight human devel-
opment focused goals (eradication of extreme poverty, universal
primary education, gender equality, the reduction of child mortal-
ity, maternal health, combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other glo-
bal diseases, environmental sustainability and global
partnership). Of course, in practice, this more liberal vision of
development was still set within a traditional ‘‘North-South aid
agenda” (Fukuda-Parr, 2016) that was dictated mainly by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor country
members and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Monitoring mechanisms,
such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and aid condi-
tionality, helped to ensure domestic uptake of MDG goals and tar-
gets but also reproduced North-South power relationships and
failed to engage with the specificities of place and different geo-
political contexts (for a discussion see: Chibba, 2011; Fukuda-
Parr, 2011; McGregor & Sumner, 2010; Stein & Horn, 2012). The
MDGs succeeded in reducing tensions around what ‘‘development”
meant and had some positive effects on human wellbeing. But as
Hulme (2010) has shown, they fell considerably short in terms of
addressing the needs and rights of the world’s poor.
Fast forward fifteen years on from the Millennium Moment. In
2015, the MDGs gave way to the SDGs, which have emerged from
the more consultative Agenda 2030 process. The latter is typical of
the twenty first century global governance architecture and has
been designedwith the direct involvement of actors from the global
South, via the Rio+20 conference and intensive multi-stakeholder
debateswithin an ‘‘OpenWorking Group” of the UNGeneral Assem-
bly – initially representing 70 countries and later open to universal
participation of all member states, civil society groups, businesses,
and UN agency representatives (Chasek, Wagner, Leone, Lebada &
Risse 2016; Fukuda-Parr, 2016). Low- and especially middle-
income countries in the global South, particularly those assembled
in the Group 77 plus China, played a much more significant role in
the Agenda 2030 process. A key demand by this group of countries,
which was incorporated within the final Agenda 2030 document, is
recognition of ‘‘common but differentiated responsibilities”
(CBDRs) as a key principle for SDG delivery. Agenda 2030 thus
implies respect for national policy space to establish and implement
distinctive policies for sustainable development, potentially sug-
gesting that national autonomy can trump global commitments.
As Sexsmith and McMichael (2015) argue, the SDGs assign delivery
responsibilities to states, ultimately leaving patterns and practises
of engagement open to state elites to decide. Additionally, the
new goals are also difficult to turn into quantifiably measurable
targets (Parnell, 2016) and lack legally binding accountability
mechanisms (Brolan, 2016; Pogge & Sengupta, 2016). They are, con-
sequently, more open to interpretation than their predecessors and
their generic nature means that they sometimes have little to say
about the detail of contemporary challenges of governance in the
global South (Hulme, Savoia & Sen, 2015). Taking all this into
account suggests that the SDGs should be understood as a much
looser script for global development than their predecessors. They
provide a very broad set of goals and targets, lack clear guidelines
on implementation, and – following the principle of CBDRs – are
not automatically expected to be integrated into national and local
development policies at the domestic level.
At the same time, the global shifts that began after 1989 have
intensified. The power transition to the East, at least in the eco-
nomic domain, and the rapid expansion of middle income power
are more evident than ever (Ikenberry, 2008; Kahler, 2013;
Shambaugh, 2013). Western aid donors now compete for influence
with new Southern donors, mainly representing middle-income
countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa), MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and CIVETs
(Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey) (Gray & Murphy,
2013; Schulz, 2010; Scoones Amanor, Favareto & Qi, 2016). The
role of non-DAC donors is indisputable, with non-DAC ‘‘aid” and
‘‘aid-like” flows increasing from approximately 5 per cent of global
ODA in the late 1990s to around 15–20 per cent at present (UNDP
2013 cited in Mawdsley, 2017), with China playing a particularly
significant role (Gray & Murphy, 2013; Mohan & Lampert, 2013;
Mohan, 2013; Scoones et al., 2016; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power,
2010).
And, if the global regime for aid has changed, so too has the rel-
ative weight of middle-income countries more widely. A range of
countries from all world regions have made the leap from low-
to mid-income status, with an increasing number of the world’s
poor residing within them. According to Sumner (2013: 374), in
the 1990s approximately ‘‘90% of the world’s poor people (by both
$1.25 and $2 international poverty lines) lived in low income coun-
tries” and ‘‘addressing global poverty was framed largely around
international redistribution of aid”. In contrast, by 2008 ‘‘70–80%
of the world’s poor. . . lived in middle income countries” (ibid). This
group of countries is becoming less directly dependent on aid and
more willing, consequently, to understand development in ways
that depart from ‘‘global” prescriptions.
Increasingly, strategies to tackle inequality and poverty at home
are being designed in accordance with domestic visions of what
development should mean within specific middle-income coun-
tries (Gulrajani, 2017; Mawdsley, 2017). These domestic visions
are, needless to say, not homogenous. They may draw, for example,
on indigenous forms of knowledge that are sometimes framed as
development alternatives (Kothani, Demaria, & Acosta, 2014;
Radcliffe, 2015), or on ideas that have been adapted from Western
economics, including variants of neoliberalism, Keynesianism,
state developmentalism or post-neoliberalism (Fukuda-Parr &
Shiga, 2016; Gray & Murphy, 2013). The key point, however, is that
the ideational shift in global politics combined with the fact that
middle-income countries are winning the space to elaborate devel-
opment plans in accordance with the preferences of domestic gov-
erning elites. And the fact that they will have to rely on deploying
national resources to meet development targets because of the
changing fortunes of the West, triggered by, among other factors,
the 2007/08 economic crisis and its aftermath (Gore, 2015;
Gulrajani, 2017; Heinrich, Kobayashi & Bryant, 2016; Lancaster,
2007; Mawdsley, 2015), only increases their autonomy; during
the very period in which the SDGs were being negotiated ODA fell,
with a 12 per cent real drop in funds disbursed during 2014–15. In
short, it seems that international development is entering a new
‘‘age of national interests” (Gulrajani, 2017) and national ideas
about what development means.
There is, as yet, an incomplete understanding of what thismeans
for the SDGs. Certainly, the importance of domestic governance to
the SDGs (as it was for the MDGs) has been recognised, though
chiefly in relation to whether poor governance or lack of state
capacity constitute obstacles to implementation (Joshi, Barry, &
Sisk, 2015; Nilsson & Persson, 2017; Waage et al, 2015; Wild &
Foresti, 2011). Less attention has been paid, overall, to the possibil-
ity that, in this new scenario, the SDGs open renewed opportunities
for domestic actors to shape national debates. This approach, how-
ever, fits with the new global reality of greater independence on the
part of middle-income countries and acknowledges the power of
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the SDGs not as a coherent agenda applicable in the same way
across the global South but, as constructivist scholars of Interna-
tional Relations would put it, a set of ideas or global script, the
meaning of which is open to interpretation – in the words of
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 891), a broad global ‘‘standard of
appropriate behaviour” that domestic actors can borrow from and
adapt. Seen in this way, the SDGs become ideas that shape or legit-
imise domestic institutional arrangements (Haas, 2015) but that,
equally, are open to interpretation by states and other actors with
CBDRs, meaning that their impact on the ground will differ consid-
erably from place to place. If the SDGs are understood in thisway, as
norms that can be ‘‘localised” (Acharya 2004, 245), it makes sense
to ask how – if at all – they are interpreted or ‘‘translated” by
domestic groups (Engle Merry, 2009) and how far such translations
echo pre-existing development preferences of mid-income coun-
tries, something we focus on here.
3. Methods and case study
Exploring the domestic interpretation of norms or the domestic
uses of global ideas benefits from a qualitative case study approach
because it enables researchers to identify the often-contested
meanings that norms assume and privileges a focus on domestic
actors, agency, and practices (see Engle Merry, 2009, Grugel &
Peruzzotti, 2007, 2012). We have opted here to focus on the mean-
ing of the SDGs in a single case study, Ecuador. Whilst a compara-
tive case study approach would be helpful to identify differences
between national cases, we want to explore here the similarities
and differences that emerge within a single case and between
national actors, who are nevertheless responding to the same set
of norms (the SDGs). By restricting the study to one country case,
we have been able to zoom in on details of difference between pol-
icy makers within Ecuador, adding another layer to debates about
domestic governance and the SDGs, which often assume a unified
‘‘national” position5, mainly studied through analysis of country
PRSPs, national government reports or development plans (Fukuda-
Parr, 2010; Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2015; Vandemoortele, 2005).
Ecuador was not selected randomly as our case. A relatively
autonomous middle-income country, Ecuador has changed
recently from being a lower middle-income and donor-
dependent country to high middle-income status which promotes
its own domestic vision of development – Buen Vivir. Ecuador is,
therefore, illustrative of the growing numbers of countries with
greater leverage vis-à-vis global development ideas than in the
era of the MDGs. Active in G77, Ecuador also was one of the coun-
tries that pushed for the incorporation of the principle of CBDRs
within Agenda 2030. Of course, we are not suggesting that all
middle-income countries will behave as Ecuador does in relation
to the SDGs. But there is evidence that middle-income countries,
and indeed smaller states, are increasingly critical of mainstream
global governance prescriptions (Cooper, 2014), and that interna-
tional development itself is becoming more polycentric and diffuse
(Scholte & Soderbaum, (2017). Ecuador is typical of those countries
no longer constrained by established ideas about development,
where national elites are able to articulate independent ideas
about how development should proceed.
Moreover, Ecuador is also typical of those countries in the glo-
bal South where domestic governance is becoming more complex
(Hulme et al., 2015), reflecting the general trend towards spatial
de-concentration of power and the growing significance of gover-
nance below the state, including at city-level (Berdegue,
Bebbington & Escobal, 2015; Chen, 2017; McGranahan, Schensul
& Singh, 2017; van der Kamp, Lorentzen & Mattingly, 2017). Ecua-
dor introduced legislative reforms in 2010 that deepened decen-
tralisation and created a multiplicity of actors with the
legitimacy and right to intervene in debates on national develop-
ment. The capital city, Quito, in particular, has a politically and
financially independent local government with its own set of prior-
ities. Carrying out the research in Ecuador, therefore, enabled us to
explore the relationship between national level debates about
development and the SDGs, and, at the same time, examine how
the complexity of domestic governance in a middle income coun-
try is now less constrained by pressure to conform to mainstream
development agendas in the process of shaping national responses.
Qualitative fieldwork was carried out in Quito, which is both the
seat of national government and of city government, in 2016. 27
semi-structured interviews were carried out with senior policy
makers and civil servants in Ecuador’s national government and
Quito’s local government, high-level representatives in interna-
tional organisations and donor bodies, as well as local academics
(see Box 1). Interviews were designed to open discussions around
Ecuador’s response to Agenda 2030 and the meaning and influence
of the SDGs in shaping aspirations and practices of what develop-
ment means for policy makers (see Box 2 for list questions used to
guide semi-structured interviews). Following our interviews, some
SENPLADES staff offered to set their views down in writing. This
correspondence, along with the interviews, were analysed inde-
pendently and then compared with findings from other interviews.
Box 1 Key informants. National government
 National Secretary for Planning and Development – SEN-
PLADES (Interviews and written correspondence with
senior bureaucrats representing the deputy ministries of
national planning, territorial planning, monitoring & eval-
uation, and development planning)
 Office of the Vice-President (Interview with former Minis-
ter of Social and Economic Development)
 Ministry of Urban Development and Housing – MIDUVI
(Interviews with three senior bureaucrats of the deputy
ministries of housing and public space/ habitat)
 Secretary for Technical Development Cooperation –
SETECI (Interview with senior member of staff working
on DAC/ non-DAC cooperation)
 Technical Secretary for Disabilities – SETEDIS (Interviews
with three senior policy advisors working on disability
rights)
 Council for the Development of Indigenous Peoples and
Nations – CODENPE (Interview with director)
 National Institute for Statistics – INEC (Interview with
senior staff working on SDG integration)
Municipal government of Quito
 Development Planning Unit (Interview with director and
two senior advisors)
 Territorial Planning Unit (Interview with director and two
senior advisors)
 Social Inclusion Unit (Interview with two senior members
of staff working on indigenous affairs and disability)
5 Bias towards the national state and a unified national position can also be
explained by the fact that agenda setting documents on international development,
such as Agenda 2030, consider national governments as main actor responsible for
implementing different global goals and targets. In the context of the SDGs, only goal
11 on making ‘cities inclusive, safe, and resilient’ recognises, and then only to an
extent, the vital role of governance below the state. Ironically, even the New Urban
Agenda articulated by Habitat III in October 2016, downplays the autonomous role of
city governance, emphasising instead ‘‘the leading role of national governments (. . .)
in the definition and implementation of inclusive and effective urban policies and
legislation for sustainable urban development.” (UN-Habitat, 2016, article 15b).
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Others
 Union of South American Nations – UNASUR (Interview
with bureaucrat working on regional development and
Ecuador’s position)
 United Nations Development Programme – UNDP (Inter-
view with senior member of staff working on SDG integra-
tion in Ecuador)
 German Development Cooperation – GIZ (Interview with
director of indigenous development programme
PROINDIGENA)
 Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Interviews with
three social science academics, one of them representing
a former mayor of Quito)
 Regional Autonomous University of the Andes (Interview
with two social science academics)
In order to contextualise the data from interviews and written
communications, and to strengthen the rigour of our findings, we
triangulated interview material with additional information and
data on the SDGs and domestic politics in Ecuador and elsewhere.
The latter included published academic and policy research,
national and local development plans, laws, policy statements,
white papers, and media reports. This was complemented by
analysis of preparatory documents, active participation and
observation of informal discussions at the Habitat III summit,
which took place in Quito in October 2016 and focused on the
SDGs and their application in urban contexts in Ecuador and
globally.
Box 2 Question guidelines for semi-structured interviews.
 What was the position of your organisation towards the
MDGs?
 How did you integrate the MDGs into national/ local devel-
opment planning?
 How do you evaluate the process of MDG
implementation?
 What is the position of your organisations towards the
SDGs?
 Does your position towards the SDGs differ from your pre-
vious take on the MDGs? If so, how?
 How do the SDG goals and targets relate to the develop-
ment approach promoted by your organisation?
 What are your development priorities? How do the SDGs
relate to these priorities? What are differences/ similari-
ties? Common sub-questions included:
o Why do you prioritise this issue/ these issues?
o What are interventions in these areas?
o How do they relate to the SDGs?
o Do you continue working on previously identified
domestic development priorities after the ratification
of the SDGs?
 How do you evaluate the process of integration of devel-
opment priorities/ SDGs into national/ local development
plans, policies and practices? Common sub-questions
included:
o What are financial/ institutional/ processual/ political
strengths/ weaknesses in this process?
o Who are the actors responsible for this process?
o How do you evaluate collaboration between these dif-
ferent groups?
o Do actors outside the government (private/ civil society/
international donors) interfere in this process? If so, how?
Most interviews lasted between 30 and 90min.
4. Ecuador: Changing development priorities amid political and
economic transformation
Ecuador was classified as upper middle-income country for the
first time in 2008 (Domínguez & Caria, 2016a). Its upper middle-
income status came after a long period of economic growth
between 2006 and 2014 (4.3% a year on average), based on com-
modity exports. Growth enabled Ecuador to put an end to the polit-
ical instability that had previously prevented the emergence of an
independent or autonomous agenda for development (de la Torre,
2006; Mainwaring, 2006). Until 2006, dependent on support from
the World Bank and the IMF, Ecuador tended to adopt global pre-
scriptions as a substitute for national priorities on development.
Like other countries in the Andean region, such as Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Peru, and Venezuela, Ecuador’s government followed donor
advice and adapted a set of reforms often referred to as the neolib-
eral multicultural model to development (Andolina, Laurie &
Radcliffe, 2009; van Cott, 2008). One set of reforms promoted
reducing national government control over policy by sharing and
redistributing of responsibilities to lower tiers of government and
non-state institutions such as private enterprises, donors, NGOs,
and civil society groups, including organisations representing
Ecuador’s highly politicised indigenous communities. Meanwhile,
an economic reform package was introduced by the government
to devalue the currency, free price and exchange rates from gov-
ernment control, reduce government public spending, and encour-
age privatisation of core domestic industries such as mining and
agriculture (ibid). In the same period, the MDGs became, almost
by default, the country’s chief priorities regarding human develop-
ment. To oversee implementation, Ecuador established a new gov-
ernment department, the National Office for the Millennium
Development Goals (SODEM) in 2005, with responsibility for over-
seeing and monitoring implementation (Naranja Bonilla, 2008).
Economic crisis, however, meant that the incorporation of the
MDGs into national targets made limited impact in terms of reduc-
ing extreme poverty, closing education gaps between women and
men, or combating child and maternal mortality (ibid), resulting
in a view within government that the wholesale transfer of global
development goals into national objectives for development had
very real limitations in terms of addressing national challenges.
At the same time, donor dependency, economic crisis, and slow
progress in terms of social development fed into political unrest
and encouraged social movements to challenge the imposition of
a global development agenda. Particularly in Ecuador’s capital city,
Quito, popular movements representing workers, peasants, urban
residents, indigenous peoples, and other dispossessed groups
organised to actively contest neoliberal development agendas,
which they perceived as the imposition of exogenous politico-
economic interests (Andolina et al., 2009; van Cott, 2008). Ulti-
mately, social protest led to the election of President Rafael Correa
and Alianza País in 2000, amid promises of radical change. Elected
chiefly by the poor and the dispossessed, this left-leaning govern-
ment promised a ‘‘post-neoliberal” political agenda (Grugel &
Riggirozzi, 2012; 2018) and was committed to reasserting national
control of macro-economic policies and enhanced social welfare.
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Once in office, Correa’s government introduced a variety of
reforms that promoted a ‘‘return of the state” and aimed at estab-
lishing greater independence from non-state actors and institu-
tions (Elwood, Bond, Martinez Novo & Radcliffe, 2016).
Domestically, this meant that core programmes and interventions,
such as managing indigenous affairs, which were previously out-
sourced to non-state institutions were either reintegrated within
the state or brought to a close (see also section 4). In terms of inter-
national relations, the government set up the Commission for Pub-
lic Credit Audit (CAIC), the aim of which is to reduce dependency to
foreign credit and aid, especially from DAC donors. Ecuador re-
negotiated its debt payments, leading to savings of USD 2.2 billion
as well as USD 7 billion in interest by 2030 (Childs and Hearn,
2017). It also intensified natural resource extraction and sold rights
for the exploitation of natural resources to a variety of foreign
stakeholders, mainly from China and Brazil (Domínguez & Caria
2016b; Gudynas, 2009; Vallejo, 2014). With more financial
resources available, the government invested in public service pro-
vision, increasing its spending from 21 per cent GDP in 2012 to 40
per cent in 2012, thereby significantly contributing to the reduc-
tion of poverty and extreme poverty (Appe, 2017).
With greater confidence in its capacity to reduce poverty
through targeted interventions and expanded coverage, the gov-
ernment began to question the wisdom of using global develop-
ment goals to shape national policy. In the process, the MDGs
gradually came to be seen not only minimalist and overly general,
but also as somewhat distant from domestic needs and priorities. A
senior civil servant from SENPLADES explains:
The MDGs did not consider the national and local particularities
of development in our country, including inequalities based
upon territory, ethnicity, race and gender [and] the need to
respect the environment and nature, and to confront and
address shifts in population concentration in cities, especially
in slums. (Interview, Quito, April 2016)
Key issues that the new Ecuadorian government felt were being
ignored included inequalities between different social groups, the
protection of the environment and of nature, and the socio-
spatially uneven development of cities. Developing a new set of
policies that embraced these concerns was considered crucial both
for national development and, more specifically, to satisfy Alianza
Pais’s electorate. The government’s distinctive development
agenda of Buen Vivir6 (in English: to live well) emerged, then, in part
because the MDGs were rejected as too conservative. Instead, Buen
Vivir promised inclusive and equitable development based on the
fundamental tenet that no one can live well if others live badly. As
a corollary to the fact that Buen Vivir is a national development plan,
its norms and principles are lodged in the 2008 constitution, not in
an international agenda, and national and local government institu-
tions are the chief agents of delivery, not international donors (see
for example CPE Ecuador, 2008, article 38). The Constitution empha-
sizes redistribution (see articles 3.5, 285.2, 300), recognises specific
cultural, economic, political and social rights for indigenous peoples
(see, amongst others, articles 56, 57, 171) and people with disabili-
ties (see, amongst others, articles 35, 42, 46.3, 47, 48, 49), as well
as rights of nature (article 71). It also explicitly acknowledges the
‘‘right to the city” based on ‘‘the democratic management of the city,
with respect to the social and environmental function of property
and the city and with the full exercise of citizenship” (article 31).
Buen Vivir was accompanied by strategies to strengthen state
capacity to deliver development. SENPLADES replaced SODEM in
2007, and took over its role in deciding domestic development
priorities. Unlike technocrats working in previous governments
who often had links with international institutions such as the
IMF, SENPLADES staff tend to come from domestic academic insti-
tutions or NGOs associated with a variety of unorthodox
approaches to development, ranging from post-colonialism,
heterodox economics or radical democracy (de la Torre, 2013).
SENPLADES is now responsible for ensuring that the state
becomes the chief enabler of domestic development (de la
Torre, 2013; Radcliffe, 2012; Walsh, 2010). It does so by setting
domestic development priorities through national development
plans, training national and local government staff on their imple-
mentation (Radcliffe, 2012; Walsh, 2010) and promoting capacity
through the decentralization of the state. The 2010 Organic Code
of Territorial Organisation, Autonomy and Decentralisation (COO-
TAD) expressly enables actors and agencies below the state to set
and implement their own locally specific development targets.
Municipal governments are granted the authority to define spatial
development planning criteria, local economic development
strategies, citizen participation mechanisms, transport plans, local
healthcare, and education and security approaches, giving them
considerable influence not only over delivery but also over policy
design.
Both the 2009 and 2013 Plans highlighted the need to
strengthen collective or group rights for more equitable devel-
opment and the importance of responding quickly to the grow-
ing challenges in urban settlements, where approximately two
thirds of Ecuador’s population now live. But setting out key
domestic priorities did not mean that Ecuador openly turned
its back on either the language of the MDGs or the MDG pro-
cess. The 2013 national development plan recognises the MDGs
as important principles; but equally, they were described as
only ‘‘minimum goals” compared to Ecuador’s more ‘‘maximal-
ist” approach (Buen Vivir) which would enable the country to
‘‘surpass the expectations of this global body [UN]’ and produce
‘irreversible, rapid, profound, radical change in this country”
(SENPLADES, 2013: 18). And indeed, as SENPLADES (2014)
pointed out, Ecuador had achieved all MDGs, except MDG 5
on maternal mortality by 2014 and so needed to set more
ambitious development goals.
SENPLADES has taken a similar approach to the SDG process,
mixing respect for the global goals with the articulation of
national-specific targets that are then linked back to Agenda
2030. Officially, the position of the government in 2015, when
the SDGs were announced, was that it would consider the SDGs
in relation to the next development planning round, which was
not due until 2017, after the Presidential elections (that led to elec-
tion of Lenin Moreno, Correa’s Vice-President and candidate of the
governing party). As a senior staff member in UNDP, Ecuador
(interview in Quito, April 2016) told us, the formal view from gov-
ernment was that ‘‘preparation of the next plan will be undertaken
by the next political administration. It is only then that we expect
that the SDGs will be officially integrated [into national planning]”.
But in practice Ecuador has followed the SDG process and engaged
closely with it. SENPLADES even seems to have tried to upload
Ecuador’s own domestic priorities onto the global SDG agenda.
According to the Assistant Secretary for National Planning in SEN-
PLADES (interview in Quito, April 2016):
[in the SDG negotiations] we especially pushed for the introduc-
tion of new concepts [right to the city; Buen Vivir] and. . . the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. We also
promoted [environmental rights] and the inclusion of goals
around migration, disability, gender, indigenous groups, etc.
Of course, this might be something of an exaggerated claim
(though Ecuador’s as well as other countries distinct efforts of pro-
moting inclusive cities (SDG11) through the right to the city were
6 See Caria and Domínguez (2016) for a more detailed conceptual background on
Buen Vivir.
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acknowledged in the New Urban Agenda, outcome document of
Habitat III); but it is nevertheless symbolic of much more assertive
approach than earlier.
More widely, SENPLADES has opted to use the SDGs as a discur-
sive tool to lend support to aspects of the national development
strategy, whilst also pointing out that they have limitations as a
guide for policy. In written correspondence with us following
face-to-face interviews, SENPLADES senior staff wrote:
The utility of the SDGs is that they represent a starting point for
national planning and for the generation of new economic,
social and productive policy approaches. But it is still a limited
agenda, which would not allow us to achieve our more ambi-
tious national goals and targets that are mainly framed around
rights (May 2016)
and
SENPLADES and INEC [National Institute for Statistics] are
already in process of defining and prioritizing SDG goals, targets
and indicators in such a way that they strengthen national plan-
ning. Our view is that Agenda 2030 should be aligned to
national planning and delivered based on our established devel-
opment model, visions, priorities and policies. (May 2016).
SENPLADES staff went on to explain that they saw engaging
with SDG 10.2 (on group rights) and SDG 11 (on making cities
and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable)
as particularly critical, since these were key to the goals set under
Buen Vivir:
For us, this [engaging with the SDGs] means strengthening the
means of implementation for core areas, including recognition
of vulnerable groups – including women, indigenous peoples,
and people with disabilities, (. . .) and the right to the city (Per-
sonal written communication from SENPLADES, May 2016)
Precisely because these are the goals that Ecuador has selected,
we turn now to a discussion of how exactly policy makers have
engaged with them.
5. SDG 10.2 on group inequalities: Disability versus ethnicity
SDG10 refers to the importance of reducing inequalities
between and within countries. SDG 10.2 focuses in particular on
empowering and promoting social, economic and political inclu-
sion irrespective of age, sex, disability, ethnicity, origin or religion
or on ‘‘group rights”. Buen Vivir also asserts the rights to inclusion
of Ecuador’s historically marginalised groups, offering an appar-
ently easy synergy between global and national aspirations.
5.1. National government responses
The national government, first under Rafael Correa (2006–2016)
and since 2017 under Lenin Moreno, has chosen to tie SDG 10.2 not
to policies on ethnicity, in the mould of previous governments that
adopted a neoliberal multicultural model to development
(Andolina et al., 2009; van Cott, 2008), but in relation to people
with disabilities. This can be explained in part by the tense rela-
tionship between Alianza Pais and indigenous communities and
associated opposition parties as a result of the government’s deci-
sion to sell mining rights over land held by indigenous communi-
ties to foreign companies, bypassing internationally agreed
mechanisms on community rights to prior consultation, as well
as closing down institutions and programmes targeting indigenous
peoples (Becker, 2013; Elwood et al., 2016). But the decision to
focus on disability was also about using the SDGs to showcase a
genuinely innovative set of policies that emerged in Ecuador long
before the ratification of Agenda 2030.
The national government began to pioneer a new approach to
disability in 2007, following an initiative of Lenin Moreno’s, then
Vice-President, who is a himself a wheelchair user. The rights of
people with disabilities, along with other group rights, were
enshrined in the 2008 constitution. As a former Minister of the
Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES) and the Coordi-
nating Ministry of Political Economy (MCEP) pointed out (inter-
view in Quito, April 2016):
Let me be completely open with you, all our work on disability
was started under the direction of the former Vice-President
[Lenin Moreno Garces] who himself suffers from disability. He
used his privileged position at the right moment, when the gov-
ernment had sufficient resources in place to introduce crucial
reforms.
Shortly after being elected, the government began to identify
the needs of people with disabilities so as to design new strategies
of inclusion. The Manuela Espejo programme, which ran between
2009 and 2011, was the first serious attempt in Ecuador to under-
stand the link between disability and social and economic exclu-
sion. Health professionals, psychologists, social workers, the
armed forces and government staff worked together to identify
the needs of disabled people in relation to housing, work, income,
education, and healthcare, interviewing more than 294,000 people
with disabilities (interview, senior civil servant in the Technical
Secretary for Disabilities (SETEDIS), Quito, April 2016). SETEDIS
was then set up to mainstream a draft of policies and oversee
cross-departmental co-operation. A senior civil servant in SETEDIS
explained:
We [SETEDIS] determine strategies and implementation. Then
we transfer implementation responsibilities to the relevant
ministries. We also send some members of our team to work
directly with staff in different ministries. This allows us to opti-
mize human resources and to generate know-how on disability
within other institutions. It means that other ministries don’t
start from scratch and that they get help in setting up support
mechanisms, something they can later manage by themselves
(interview in Quito, April 2016).
Funding has been generous, increasing from 0.01 per cent of the
annual budget in 2008 to 3.07 per cent in 2015 (SETEDIS, 2015).
One of the flagship programmes, the Joaquin Gallegos Lara pro-
gramme created in 2009, provides a USD 240 per month to a per-
sonal carer and had 20,715 beneficiaries by 2015. Housing
subsidies for the disabled were also introduced in 2015 (interview
in Quito, April 2016), leading to the construction of 11,000 new
houses specifically for disabled people and their families. The gov-
ernment also set up credit schemes, coordinated by the central
government disability organisation (CONADIS), for people with
disabilities who want to set up their own small businesses.
Between 2009 and 2015, more than USD 9 million have been
invested into this programme, with 80,281 beneficiaries. In addi-
tion, the Ministry of Health provides people with disabilities tech-
nical and health support, the Ministry of Culture and Patrimony as
well as the Ministry of Education run educational programmes for
people with disabilities, and MIDUVI set up infrastructure pro-
grammes around accessibility and disaster risk management.
Taken together, these policies have contributed to very consid-
erable progress in quite a short period. Indeed, Ecuador’s policies
are increasingly regarded as an international best-practice case,
in the global South at least (Camacho Vásconez, Figueroa,
Gavilanez & Alban Morejon, 2013; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2017). In
2015, for example, the national government led the drafting of
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an inclusive risk management methodology for the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR) to promote the inclusion of people
with disabilities across South America (interview with a member
of staff at UNASUR, Quito, April 2016), and, during Habitat III in
October 2016, SETEDIS and other Ecuadorian Ministries organised
a series of parallel and side events on disability and the New Urban
Agenda. This served in promoting Ecuador’s approach as best prac-
tice example for meeting SDG 10.2 in cities. In the meantime, by
showcasing the government’s SDG success story around disability
during Habitat III side events and in the ‘‘Ecuador Pavilion”, ‘‘One
World Pavilion” and the ‘‘Habitat III Exhibition” – spaces also open
to the general and predominantly Ecuadorean public – the govern-
ment used Habitat III to strengthen its domestic image and gain
public support for interventions in this policy sector7.
These policies are, needless to say, not attributable to SDG 10.2;
disability was already a domestic priority. But SDG 10.2 legitimizes
the emphasis on disability in welfare spending and they offer the
opportunity for Ecuador to use the SDG process to validate national
policies and raise Ecuador’s international profile as best-practice
role model in this area, whilst effectively directing attention away
from those inequalities that are of less priority to national govern-
ment and more contentious domestically. As we noted above, there
is, in fact, much less of an enabling domestic environment in rela-
tion to other forms of group inequalities, in particular, inequalities
rooted in ethnicity. In fact, under Correa, the government not only
failed to act to protect the land rights of indigenous communities
but took steps to dismantle indigenous institutions and pro-
grammes to silence internal dissent. The Directorate for Intercul-
tural and Bilingual Education (DINEIB), the Secretary of Peoples,
and the Coordinating Ministry of Patrimony were all closed. As a
senior member of staff in the National Council for the Development
of Indigenous Peoples (CODENPE, interview in Quito, April 2016)
pointed out to us: ‘‘First, they [the government] cut our funding,
then they closed our institutions, and finally they stopped our pro-
grammes.” The National Council for the Development of Indige-
nous Peoples (CODENPE) has seen its budget shrink year on year
since 2013 and is now also scheduled for closure8 (personal com-
munication with senior staff member in CODENPE, April 2016). Yet
the government may also be in a position to ‘‘cover” its worsening
record on indigenous rights by pointing to its excellent record and
SDG 10.2 success story, on disability support.
5.2. Local government responses in Quito
The picture gets even more complicated once we consider the
practices of actors operating at the sub-national level. In Quito,
the municipal government views inequalities based on ethnicity
as at least as much of a priority for policy as support for disabled
people and sees SDG 10.2 as demanding government action on
both fronts. This is mainly due to the size of indigenous communi-
ties in Quito and their capacity for rapid mobilization, which
means that local politicians and municipal authorities, guided as
much by aspirations to stay in office as principle, cannot afford
not to recognize their presence (Horn, 2017). As such, the munici-
pal government has sponsored a variety of interventions targeted
predominantly to peripheral poor urban neighbourhoods where
most residents are of indigenous descent. These have been rolled
out in response to civil society pressures which are able to
influence decision making processes at the local level since local
governments are less insulated, as a member of staff in Quito’s
municipality (interview, October 2016) explained:
For the national government, indigenous peoples represent 4
per cent of the country. In Quito, they only represent 7 per cent
but that number is different for some districts. Especially in the
Northern and Southern periphery they sometimes represent 60,
70 or 80 per cent of the population. They increasingly organise
around their indigenous background and mobilise for their con-
stitutional rights. The leaders of indigenous organisations come
to the municipal offices again and again, over the years, to pre-
sent specific demands. After a while the municipal government
simply had to respond.
Initiatives include participatory budgeting, bilingual service
provision and an acknowledgement that citizenship can be
expressed through collective deliberation rather than individual
votes. Indigenous cultural events, such as the annual festival of
the sun (Inti Reymi), receive municipal funding and the municipal
territorial planning unit began to employ a member of staff in
2016 whose task it is to identify practical ideas for integrating col-
lective indigenous rights to land within municipal land use plans
which have traditionally only recognised individual tenure.
Although, as we show below, the process of privatisation of land
is creating push-backs in Quito against indigenous land rights, pol-
icy makers in Quito have overall been more enthusiastic in pro-
moting indigenous peoples’ group rights and they have seen SDG
10.2 as an opportunity not just to endorse city-level policies but
to distinguish themselves from the national government.
6. SDG 11 on inclusive cities: Right to the city versus ‘‘leaving no
one behind
SDG11 addresses the challenges associated with rapid urbanisa-
tion and promotes the adoption of policies to make cities inclusive,
resilient, safe and sustainable. In Ecuador, these challenges are
considerable. In 1950, around 40 per cent of Ecuador’s 3.2 million
residents lived in cities. By 2010 this has increased to 63 per cent,
meaning that around nine million of Ecuador’s 14.5 million resi-
dents currently live in cities (MIDUVI, 2015). Urban expansion
has not been planned and 2.8 million people live in peripheral set-
tlements that frequently lack secure tenure, basic services, and
public transport links (ibid). Urban poverty, inequality and exclu-
sion fuelled the popular uprisings of the early 2000s and the
Alianza Pais government included a new emphasis on urban pov-
erty and urban development, defined as the right to the city, within
Ecuador’s constitution, Ecuador used the preparatory process of
Agenda 2030 and the Habitat III summit in Quito, where the imple-
mentation of SDG 11 was discussed, to gain recognition for its own
approach. And indeed, the New Urban Agenda (2016, art. 11), the
outcome document of Habitat III, specifically acknowledges that
‘‘some national and local governments [like Ecuador]” address
SDG 11 through the ‘‘right to the city, in their legislations, political
declarations and charters”, thereby giving credit to Ecuador’s
approach.
Yet, in practice, progress towards the right to the city agenda
and, hence towards SDG 11 and the New Urban Agenda, is likely
to prove slow. This is mainly due the conflicts associated with bur-
geoning cities, in Ecuador as elsewhere in the rapidly urbanising
global South, where the value of urban land is increasing and con-
flicts proliferating over access to housing and services and where
the meaning of SDG11 and the New Urban Agenda is subject to
extraordinary contestation (Parnell, 2016). Trying to create ‘‘inclu-
sive cities” inevitably means confronting vested interests; and
rapid urbanization creates multiplying, and conflicting, pressures
7 For a summary of an event on disability in the ‘UN Pavilion’ this topic organised
by Ecuador’s government see for example: http://habitat3.org/the-conference/pro-
gramme/all/un-dspddesa-ecuador-high-level-meeting-and-forum-on-disability-
inclusion-and-accessible-urban-development/.
8 Since January 2017 the website of CODENPE is no longer active and according to
the newspaper El Universo (19 January 2017, http://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/
2017/01/20/nota/6005254/aprobada-ley-economia-popular) CODENPE seems to no
longer operate on its premises.
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from private and civil society groups over budgets, policies and
land use (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2013). Decentralization plays into
this highly politicized policy arena in very particular ways. In par-
ticular, the city government of Quito, which is politically opposed
to the Alianza Pais national government, has used SDG11 to articu-
late an alternative approach to urban governance. Quito’s own
planning documents now frame urban development policies
directly through the language of Agenda 2030 and promise a
‘‘Quito in solidarity: where no one is left behind” (Quito
Municipality, 2015, p. 12).
6.1. National government responses
Formally, according to the Organic Code of Territorial Organisa-
tion, Autonomy and Decentralisation (COOTAD), national govern-
ment authorities, in particular the Ministry of Urban
Development and Housing (MIDUVI), retain responsibilities for
funding social housing and establishing the legal framework for
integrated urban planning. MIDUVI has focused on extending
access to affordable social housing, especially through the provi-
sion of housing subsidies, supporting the creation of more than
10,000 social housing projects and benefitting around 20,000 poor
urban households (MIDUVI, 2015) – a significant achievement
beyond any doubt in a short period of time, even if it is a drop in
the ocean given the scale of urban needs. But setting clear guideli-
nes to reduce uncontrolled urban expansion, land speculation and
urban exclusion (for a historical review of these issues, see Moser,
2009) has proved more difficult. MIDUVI’s proposals on territorial
planning and land use management, the Organic Law of Spatial
Planning, Use and Management of Land (also called LOOTUS law),
went to Congress in 2015 with the aim of forcing city authorities
to cooperate with communities and civil society organisations
around land use. The proposed new law also contained provisions
for local authorities to raise charges for building permissions in
order to capture surplus value on transactions in the real estate
sector. This money was then to be invested in expanding social
housing provision. The LOOTUS tried, in other words, to establish
financial tools and technical guidelines for participatory, integrated
and pro-poor urban planning. Its vision corresponded both to the
domestic promises around the right to the city and, at the same
time, seemed to embody the goals of SDG 11.
Yet, even before going to Congress, LOOTUS was the subject of
contentious debate. As a member of staff in MIDUVI explained,
LOOTUS was seen fundamentally as a form of wealth redistribution
and it was unpopular with the opposition for that reason. Opposi-
tion leader Guillermo Lasso (later the losing 2017 presidential can-
didate for Creando Oportunidades) mobilised the private sector and
property owners to resist both the tax increases and the restric-
tions of land speculation it contained9. Facing a long battle in Con-
gress that it might not have won, and one that was, moreover,
impacting on government popularity – Correa’s popularity dropped
at this point from around 60 per cent to 42 per cent – the new
law was abandoned to help ensure another term in office for Alianza
Pais. As a former civil servant in MIDUVI explained: (Quito, April
2016):
We really tried our best with the LOOTUS but the public pres-
sure was too big for the President and could have lost him his
office. In summer 2015, we lost the struggle with this law. This
temporarily meant the end for a more holistic and inclusive
urban development approach that goes beyond housing
provision and redistributes profits generated from urban
interventions to those most in need. To preserve his position,
the President stopped the law and changed staff in the Ministry.
Political conditions shifted once again just a year later, how-
ever, when the April 2016 earthquake, severely affected Ecuador’s
coastal region, causing 600 deaths and destroying thousands of
houses particularly in poorer urban neighbourhoods.10 The earth-
quake was an unexpected opportunity that enabled national gov-
ernment to push suddenly for reform and it created a political
climate in which it was difficult to oppose government plans. The
LOOTUS was quickly and successfully reintroduced, presented
now as a response to the need for reconstruction. Some of the
new funding was also directed towards the urban poor (interview
in Quito, April 2016) and the government was able to simultane-
ously introduce a one-off tax of 0.9 per cent on incomes above
one million US dollars to provide emergency relief. Some five
months on from the earthquake, Ecuador’s national government
found itself able to present recent legislation and urban develop-
ment emergency packages as ‘‘best practice” right to the city
approach to achieving SDG 11 during side events and in the ‘‘Ecua-
dor Pavilion” at Habitat III in Quito11.
6.2. Local government responses in Quito
The Habitat III host city of Quito had, previously, been one of
the main sites of opposition to the LOOTUS, taking advantage of
the decentralisation process. The city level is formally responsi-
ble for the implementation of national government guidelines.
But it also has the legal authority to adjust guidelines in ways
that fit the specific urban contexts in which they operate. Con-
trolled by the opposition, municipal authorities have used these
powers to ignore the new law in favour of what they see as an
alternative approach, that is nonetheless also consistent with
the principles of inclusive urban development. This focuses
instead on allowing land reclassification but levying tax on it.
In effect, this enables land that was once designated as rural,
but now within the city, to be re-designated as urban and land
that was classified for residential use to become multi-purpose,
making it possible for businesses to take over land that was
once for housing. The new regulations increase the value of land
in the city and, therefore, real estate prices. As Quito’s head of
land planning explained, developers will be willing to be pay
the land tax (which they can pass on in the form of higher
prices) but would not accept a tax on income or profit (inter-
view April 2016). This approach, meanwhile, has been framed
as ‘‘leaving no one in the city behind”, in direct appropriation
of the language of Agenda 2030, thereby also laying down a
political challenge to the national government. As one of the
city planners told us:
Quito is offering an alternative to Correa and his government.
Why should we do the same as the previous municipal govern-
ment, which we have beaten in local elections? It’s time for us
to stand out with a different model of doing development and
urban politics. We can start now doing this at the local level
and later maybe we can do it at the national level.
9 The June 2015 protests were covered widely in the international press. See for
example: https://www.wsj.com/articles/protesters-in-ecuador-demonstrate-against-
correas-policies-1435279037 or https://www.yahoo.com/news/papal-truce-over-
ecuador-protesters-return-streets-024543042.html.
10 See also: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/world/americas/ecuador-earth-
quake.html?_r=0%22%22.
11 For further detail on events around LOOTUS (http://habitat3.org/the-conference/
programme/all/urban-legislation-in-latin-america-the-compared-experiences-of-
brazil-colombia-and-ecuador/), reconstruction and housing (http://habitat3.org/the-
conference/programme/all/proyecto-juntos-por-ti-construccion-de-viviendas-accesi-
bles-para-personas-con-discapacidad-afectadas-por-el-terremoto/), and the govern-
ment’s overall approach to planning (http://habitat3.org/the-conference/programme/
all/national-planning-and-multi-level-governance-in-ecuador/).
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The city government then took this critique also into Habitat
III. As a senior civil servant in Quito’s planning unit told us:
‘‘We introduced the SDGs in our development plan to provide
a methodological example on how global goals can be imple-
mented in Ecuadorian cities. We want to showcase our achieve-
ments during talks and events within and around the Habitat III
conference site” (Interview in Quito, April 2016). In preparation
for the conference, one of the tourist areas of Quito, La Maris-
cal, where most international Habitat III visitors stayed, was
turned into an eco-neighbourhood, with a new cultural centre
and an ‘‘inclusive city” campaign in bars, restaurants and public
spaces, indicating that these spaces are open, tolerant and
accessible to everyone, independent of age, (dis)ability, gender,
sexual and or ethnic background. UNDP delegates at the confer-
ence certainly responded well to finding such a direct echo of
the SDGs in city policy. One senior staff member in UNDP told
us that Quito ‘‘shares our objective to . . ... . . pioneer and show-
case [an] example of how SDG alignment should look like.”
(Interview in Quito, April 2016).
In short then, SDG 11 is being mobilised in Ecuador in distinct
and somewhat contradictory ways. At the level of national govern-
ment, policy makers argue that global targets on inclusive and sus-
tainable cities align with and legitimise Buen Vivir and the right to
the city approach, for which Ecuador gained acknowledgment in
the New Urban Agenda. In contrast, local government authorities
in Quito set out a more private sector friendly version of urban
inclusiveness, which they explicitly frame through the language
of SDG11, much to the delight of UNDP.
7. Conclusions
We set out in this paper to explore how middle-income coun-
tries in the global South, in our case Ecuador, respond to the SDGs,
and how – if at all – the SDGs shape domestic development policies
and practices. We posed these questions in response to rapid global
shifts in power and production and in a context of increasingly
polycentric global governance, in a country which is witnessing
both a resurgence of ‘‘national” ideas about what development
consists of and a decentralisation of authority. Both processes are
not untypical of middle income countries in the global South and
both point in the direction of increasing autonomy vis-à-vis global
development benchmarks such as the SDGs. Nevertheless, as we
show here, it is possible both to confirm to the general tenor of
Agenda 2030 and, at the same time, assert nationally-distinctive
patterns of engagement with it because the SDGs are a relatively
loose set of goals and targets, enabling governments to adapt them
to domestic development agendas in ways that were previously
impossible with the more precise, quantifiable and limited MDGs.
There is a domestic logic, in other words, to SDG implementation
that was perhaps not envisaged and is not yet captured by existing
studies.
We addressed this knowledge gap by undertaking an in-depth
qualitative case study. Ecuador’s shift from donor dependence to
development autonomy has happened in a remarkably short space
of time. Prior to 2007, Ecuador was trapped in a state of economic
crisis and donor dependency. By 2015, policy makers in Ecuador
were strategically engaging with the SDGs and making decisions
as to which of them they would focus their attention on. This rapid
transformation tells us something about the political economy of
development in Ecuador; but it also points to the pace of change
in the global political economy since other middle-income coun-
tries, including the BRICS, MINTs, and CIVETs, are also setting out
independent and distinctive approaches to national development
(Gray & Murphy, 2013; Mawdsley, 2017; Schulz, 2010; Scoones
et al., 2016).
Judging from our evidence, a more reflexive engagement does
not mean that the SDGs are irrelevant in middle income countries.
But the SDGs are not simply taken off the shelf and implemented
wholesale either. The SDGs are being mobilised selectively in Ecua-
dor to add another layer of legitimacy to policies that were already
identified as key for national development before the ratification of
Agenda 2030. Some SDG goals and targets are the focus on intense
government activity, whilst others are simply side-lined or put on
hold. The government’s discursive engagement with the language
of Agenda 2030 and some SDGs (and in practice only aspects of
those goals) is also serving to distract attention away from partial,
incomplete or highly politicised interpretations of the SDGs them-
selves. Once the rhetoric is put to one side and we assess achieve-
ments, the gains from policies are quite limited and, moreover,
unevenly distributed. In fact, except for early-stage success in
breaking inequalities around disability (SDG 10.2) – which was
the consequence of multi-sector policy reforms and funding
increases introduced prior to the ratification of Agenda 2030 –
Ecuador is actually struggling to deliver the targets which have
been declared ‘‘priority” for development, namely reducing group
inequalities for indigenous peoples (SDG 10.2) and promoting the
right to the city (SDG 11).
This study also challenges the conventional assumption that
national governments are inevitably the central actors in deliver-
ing Agenda 2030 (Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Fukuda-Parr & McNeill,
2015; Sexsmith & McMichael, 2015; Vandemoortele, 2005). We
show that decentralization matters – but how it matters is not
straightforward. In Quito, city-level authorities place a higher
value on indigenous participation in development than the
national government. At the same time, city authorities are more
aligned with private-sector demands, and less willing to protect
the social and economic rights of all citizens in the city to safe,
decent and affordable housing. Quito seems at first sight more clo-
sely aligned discursively with SDG 11 (‘inclusive cities’) than the
national government; yet in practice the city’s urban development
approach increasingly excludes the poor.
What can we take from our research more widely? While there
is a need for care in generalising from one case study, our findings
highlight a shift away from approaches that treat the SDGs as a
coherent agenda (Gore, 2015; Horner & Hulme, 2017; Sachs,
2012) that should and can be integrated into domestic policies
wholeheartedly by middle-income countries if specific conditions,
such as ‘‘good governance”, are fulfilled (Joshi et al., 2015; Nilsson
& Persson, 2017; Waage et al., 2015; Wild & Foresti, 2011). Instead,
there is a need for alternative interpretive approaches, such as
those promoted by scholars who take a constructivist perspective
to international relations (Haas, 2015), that capture the fluid
dynamics of global governance and the important role domestic
actors play in planning for development. Greater attention, in other
words, to the specificities of domestic politics in relation to the
SDGs is required. In this regard, a variety of factors stand out as
potential starting point for future policy-relevant research on the
SDGs in middle-income countries. Firstly, more attention needs
to be paid to the fact that actors involved in domestic governance
are heterogeneous, have agency, draw on specific and often pre-
established norms and ideas that shape their understanding and
policy practices around development, belong to different actor-
coalitions, and operate in a generally fragmented and changing
political, institutional, and structural environment. In Ecuador,
for example, the political environment changed significantly in a
short period of time. Before 2007, governments were more willing
to engage with non-state actor groups representing donors, the
private sector and different civil society groups. After Correa’s elec-
tion in 2007, the government promoted a ‘‘return of the state” and
emphasised selective engagement with global development goals.
Secondly, decentralisation matters for development – and it is
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being rolled out in a number of countries in the global South.
National level actors and institutions are only part of the state –
other levels are also significant (Berdegue et al., 2015; Chen,
2017; McGranahan et al., 2016; van der Kamp et al., 2017). This
is abundantly clear in the case of Quito where local government
has both the resources and the responsibilities to make meaningful
interventions in terms of designing and delivering domestic devel-
opment initiatives. Finally, our case suggests that it is only once
national and local attitudes and practices towards development
are identified, that patterns of engagement with global develop-
ment agendas can be fully deciphered. It is clear in Ecuador that
the domestic politics of engagement with the SDGs is highly selec-
tive and that national and local governments choose to engage
with those global goals and international partners that match
and reinforce their own interests and practices. Indeed, it may be
that international organisations, donor countries and development
NGOs need to consider more strategically how to engage with local
development priorities and promote an approach towards Agenda
2030 implementation that is genuinely sensitive to national and
local contexts.
To be clear, then, we are not arguing here that the SDGs or the
global politics of development are becoming irrelevant, as national
variation of ‘development’ priorities become more varied. But we
are saying that the global politics of development reflects only
one side of a prism and its significance is changing. Domestic pol-
itics are crucial, especially in the more numerous and more confi-
dent middle-income countries in the global South, for how and
why (and why not) state actors make choices, for whether they
have the capacity to implement certain global goals, and for how
successfully they are in implementing certain goals and targets
(whilst ignoring others). As such, we call for more detailed, empir-
ically grounded, policy-relevant and culturally sensitive research
that can uncover the range of context-specific national and local
short-term and long-term challenges and opportunities that will
determine domestic engagement with and uptake of some (if not
all) SDGs in middle-income countries.
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